Nation building

While the news media’s hyperventilation over the military’s supposed “operational pause” is certainly overblown, it is clear that the war in Iraq hasn’t played out as perfectly as its supporters had hoped. But the war will be won soon, and probably without too many casualties on either side, all things considered. At least we hope so.

But even assuming that conquering Iraq and ousting the Hussein regime remains a piece of cake, if not a cakewalk, for American military might, building a peaceful democratic republic in Iraq may prove to be more of a challenge.

The question may yet be whether most Iraqis, in spite of their gratitude for U.S. help in overthrowing Hussein’s regime, will welcome Americans as liberators rather than as occupiers. It’s a risky proposition.

As Steve Chapman pointed out in his column yesterday, nationalism is still a very powerful force. It is, he argues, the one universal that may yet overpower the attractiveness of participatory government. Indeed, national self-determination and democracy often go hand in hand.

What we are engaging in here is essentially a new colonolialism. No, I don’t think it is intended to exploit Iraq’s oil. But it is a benevolent attempt at helping the Iraqis help themselves and purportedly make the United States and the world safer in the process.

But the truth is we have no idea how our efforts will be received. American peacekeeping forces in Iraq may be targets of terrorism. Iraqis may, fairly or not, perceive the U.S.’s deep involvement in the government of their daily affairs as exploitation rather than education.

It’s a fine line between nation building and nation bullying. Who knows what side of the line we’ll wind up on? And even if Iraqis are happy, how will the rest of the Middle East view matters? They are already lied to by government-controlled news media.

Even if things go swimmingly, chances are that, in the long term, our short-term occupation (assuming it is short) will be not viewed favorably, and will indeed serve as greater ammunition for terrorist reprisals on American soil and American forces in the Middle East.

All of this might well be worth the risk — after all, nothing in war is guaranteed — if the threat were real and imminent. In this case it manifestly is not. This is an elective war. One that might make us ever-so-marginally safer, but which has the potential to make us much worse off. I hope all goes well. I fear it won’t. And the gap between those two leaves me confused … and angry.